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The role of expectations for market design – on structural
regulatory uncertainty in electricity markets
Mirjam Ambrosius1, Jonas Egerer1, Veronika Grimm1, Adriaan H. van
der Weijde2
Abstract. Ongoing policy discussions on the reconfiguration of bidding zones
in European electricity markets induce structural uncertainty about the future
market design. This paper deals with the question of how this structural
uncertainty affects market participants and their long-run investment decisions
in generation and transmission capacity. We propose a stochastic multilevel
model, which incorporates generation capacity investment, network expansion
and redispatch, taking into account uncertainty about the future market design.
Using a stylized two-node network, we disentangle different effects that uncer-
tainty has on market outcomes. Our results reveal that expectations about
future market structures have an important effect on investment decisions.
Unlike most parametric uncertainties, structural uncertainty about the future
market design can have a positive effect on welfare, even if a market design
change does not actually take place, although there are distributional effects.
This also implies that the welfare gains of a change to a more efficient market
design are lower if market participants already anticipate this change.
1. Introduction
The need for decarbonization of the electricity system, together with structural
changes in electricity demand and generation costs, is driving significant investment
in new and upgraded electricity transmission and generation capacity. Transmission
and generation investment projects have long lead times and lifespans, and are
therefore subject to significant levels of risk and uncertainty about among others,
future costs, demand levels and patterns, and regulation.
In response, planning methods have evolved to explicitly consider how optimal
investment decisions should be made under uncertainty. These include stochastic
optimization models, which seek to identify decisions that are optimal given the full
range of possible future market conditions (for an overview, see Conejo et al. 2010
and Möst and Keles 2010), and robust optimization models, which optimize decisions
such that the worst possible outcomes are still feasible (Ruiz and Conejo 2015).
These methods have been applied to a wide range of markets and uncertainties,
and the results of these applications clearly show that uncertainty is a key driver of
transmission and generation investment (van der Weijde and Hobbs 2012; Muñoz
et al. 2017).
However, the uncertainties that are considered in existing studies are all para-
metric as they affect investment or operational costs, or constrain decision variables.
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Parametric uncertainties are easily included in stochastic or robust models using sce-
nario sets or distributions. However, many sources of uncertainty are not parametric,
but structural and therefore much more difficult to model. This is particularly
true for regulatory uncertainties, including uncertainty about pricing methods,
competition policy, the future existence of markets for ancillary services, and many
others. These structural regulatory uncertainties are particularly important, as they
are highly idiosyncratic and therefore impossible to hedge perfectly (Ehrenmann
and Smeers 2011). Moreover, regulatory uncertainty is never resolved, as in most
legal systems policy makers cannot be bound by the decisions of their predecessors.
Despite all this, structural regulatory uncertainties have received little attention
and few methods are available to model and quantify them. This paper is a first
attempt to do so in electricity markets.
One of the sources of structural regulatory uncertainty in electricity markets,
particularly in Europe, is the future of zonal market designs. Liberalized electricity
markets in Europe currently often operate within national bidding zones. Under
this zonal pricing market design, there is a single electricity price in each country,
with pre-determined trade capacities implicitly or explicitly auctioned to allow cross-
border trade while controlling between-country congestion. Transmission constraints
within countries are not accounted for within the market, but are resolved by
system operators after market outcomes are announced, usually through cost-based
balancing mechanisms or countertrading in balancing markets.
In the short-term, this means that traded quantities might not always be techni-
cally feasible in the existing transmission network. The resulting network congestion
has to be resolved by the transmission system operator (TSO) via redispatch, i.e.,
by instructing some generators to increase or decrease their production. This is
costly, and depending on redispatch mechanisms may incentivize non-competitive
behavior. In the long term, the lack of locational investment signals within zones
might result in inefficient investment in power plants, additional transmission invest-
ment, and higher redispatch costs. With a growing share of renewables in electricity
markets worldwide, network congestion and thus costs for congestion management
are increasing in most markets.
Most large US markets have already adopted nodal (or: locational marginal)
pricing mechanisms. In these markets, market operators solve large optimization
models that calculate the least-cost set of dispatch decisions for all generators
on the system, considering at least a linearized representation of all transmission
constraints. A price is then calculated for each bus, which reflects the marginal
cost of electricity in that specific location. This reduces the need for redispatch, as
all constraints have already been included in the market, and gives more efficient
investment signals (Holmberg and Lazarczyk 2015).
In Europe, the discussion about a reconfiguration of current bidding zones is
ongoing, both in regulatory and academic spheres (e.g., Grimm et al. 2019; Ambrosius
et al. 2018; ENTSO-E 2018; Bertsch et al. 2017; Egerer et al. 2016; Grimm et al.
2016b; Plancke et al. 2016; Trepper et al. 2015; CMA 2015; Frontier Economics
and Consentec 2011). This debate, though necessary, is a key source of structural
regulatory uncertainty. The effects of this uncertainty have not been studied. Many
recent studies have attempted to estimate the benefits of adopting nodal pricing
and other structural market design changes in European electricity markets (van
der Weijde and Hobbs 2011; Neuhoff et al. 2013). However, these usually assume
that market design changes happen overnight. In reality, as the European zonal
pricing debate shows, market design changes are usually preceded by long periods of
uncertainty, during which different options are suggested and debated, and during
which it is unclear which, or even whether, changes will come about. There is,
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therefore, a need to understand how these types of structural regulatory uncertainty
affect investment and market operation.
This paper is a first attempt to address this issue of structural regulatory un-
certainty in electricity markets. We specifically consider the structural uncertainty
caused by the European zonal pricing debate, but our methods and qualitative
conclusions carry over to other types of regulatory uncertainty. We consider a
situation in which a transmission planner invests in transmission capacity, anticipat-
ing a second stage in which generation investment takes place, followed by market
operation and cost-based redispatch. At the investment stage, market participants
do not know whether the market will consist of one or multiple bidding zones;
instead, they assign a probability to each scenario. We first analyze this bidding
zone uncertainty in a small two-bus model, to qualitatively explore the results and
their main drivers.
We show that uncertainty about market design is fundamentally different from
uncertainty in market parameters, e.g., generation costs. Whereas most previous
studies have shown that the latter has negative implications, leading to a decrease in
social surplus, market design uncertainty can have a positive effect. Indeed, even if
market participants believe that there is a small possibility that additional bidding
zones will be implemented, this can already have a major impact on investment
decisions, even if this actual change never takes place. Hence, it is at least as
important to understand market participants’ expectations about future market
designs as it is to determine what markets might actually look like. However, there
are important distributional effects, between producers and consumers and between
market participants located at different zones, which need to be taken into account.
The next two sections introduce the methodology. Section 4 describes a two-node
example and Section 5 provides results including regulatory uncertainty. Section 6
discusses the main results and Section 7 concludes.
2. Modeling investment incentives under regulatory uncertainty
In this section, we introduce the underlying setting for our stochastic trilevel
market model accounting for regulatory uncertainties. The setting follows the multi-
level approach of Grimm et al. (2016a), where the regulator decides on network
capacity, while firms decide on investment in generation capacity and production in
a competitive market environment.
2.1. Timeline. To be able to capture this situation in a feasible model, we consider
a sequence of long-term and short-term decisions. The timing of a suitable stylized
game is illustrated in Figure 1. First, the TSO decides on welfare maximizing
transmission capacity expansion in anticipation of the subsequent decisions taken
by private firms and its own redispatch quantities. Additionally, the TSO can
invest in backup capacity to balance infeasible spot market solutions, anticipating
the actual need of backup capacity after spot market trading in each operating
point. This is followed by generation capacity investment of private generation
companies. They take this decision under a profit maximization objective and
in anticipation of marginal revenues earned during spot market trading over the
lifetime of the respective unit. Investments in transmission and generation capacity
are long-term decisions, which are only taken once, and have to be taken for several
years in advance. The TSO and private firms cannot be sure what the market design
will look like by the time of commissioning. All long-term decisions are therefore
taken under uncertainty about the future market design. In our specific case, there
exists uncertainty about the exact number of bidding zones. However, the TSO
and private investors assign probabilities to all possible events. These probabilities
are subjective and are not related to the actual probability of a change in market
4 M. AMBROSIUS, J. EGERER, V. GRIMM, A.H. V.D. WEIJDE
design, which is fundamentally unpredictable. They maximize the expected values
of welfare and profits, respectively. After all market participants have taken long-
term decisions under uncertainty, one of the possible market design scenarios is
realized, i.e., the number of bidding zones is known to all market participants. Now,
electricity is traded in multiple periods at the spot markets, whereby intra-zonal
network capacity is neglected, while inter-zonal network capacity is taken into
account. In case market results are not feasible in the physical network, the TSO
carries out cost-based redispatch. This means that the TSO can call power plants
in the import-constrained regions to increase production, and instruct plants in the
export-constrained regions to reduce production. In case traded quantities are still
infeasible even after cost-based redispatch, the TSO can furthermore make use of
backup capacity and increase production in import-constrained areas.
One bidding zone: P (k = 1)
More bidding zones: P (k > 1)
Uncertainty about future market design Certainty about future market design
One network
investment plan:
TSO decides on:
• Network investment
• Backup investment
One generation
investment plan:
Private generation
companies decide on
investments in
power plant capacity
Spot market
with one zonal price
Redispatch of
generation levels and
backup operation
Spot market with
zonal prices and
quantities for implicit
auctioning of cross-
zonal trade capacity
Re-dispatch of
generation levels and
backup operation
time
Figure 1. Timing of decisions on zonal configuration under
uncertainty
2.2. Translation to a trilevel model. In the following we sketch how this setting
can be translated into a stochastic trilevel model.
Level 1. At the first level, the TSO decides on transmission capacity expansion as
well as investment in backup capacity under uncertainty about the future market
design as to maximize expected welfare, anticipating all subsequent levels. The
amount of backup capacity is determined so that feasibility is achieved in each
scenario, i.e., the TSO builds the maximum capacity that is needed across all
scenarios.
Level 2. At the second level, generation capacity investment and spot market trading
in multiple periods by private firms is modeled. These decisions can be considered
jointly at one level due to (i) the assumption of perfect competition and (ii) the
absence of time interdependencies such as load-changing costs or storage constraints.
Hence, there are no interdependencies between the different subsequent periods of
spot market trading. We can therefore solve all periods of spot market trading
jointly at level 2, before determining cost-based redispatch at level 3.
Level 3. At the third level, cost-based redispatch takes place, which is determined by
the TSO. Again, cost-minimizing redispatch problems of all periods are determined
jointly at the third level due to the absence of intertemporal dependencies.
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Model interdependencies. As the TSO anticipates all subsequent levels, spot market
behavior by private firms and redispatch decisions are part of the TSO’s optimization
problem. The first level therefore depends on the decisions of the second and third
level, whereas the second level only depends on the line investment decisions taken
at the first level. Note that due to the assumption of cost-based redispatch, third-
level decisions of the TSO do not affect the profits of private firms and thus their
investment and production decisions at the second level. Investment in backup
capacity also does not affect spot market outcomes, as backup capacity is only
ramped up by the TSO in case redispatch of private generation capacity is not
sufficient to alleviate network congestion. The third level depends on decisions from
the first and second level. The dependencies of the trilevel model are illustrated in
Figure 2.
Level 3
Level 2
Level 1
Figure 2. Dependencies of the three-level model: Green, solid
arcs denote dependencies on continuous variables, the red, dashed
arc denotes dependencies on discrete variables. Source: Grimm
et al. (2019).
Grimm et al. (2016a) show that the deterministic trilevel market model can be
reformulated as a bilevel model, aggregating the first level (transmission capacity
expansion and backup capacity) and the third level (redispatch), exploiting the
weak coupling of the three levels as described previously. We explain how this
reformulation can be applied to the stochastic model in Section 3.6.
3. The trilevel market model
In this section, we will explain in detail how we model the interaction of the
market participants as described above. We will first explain how uncertainty about
the future market design is implemented, continue with the basic technical model
setup and a detailed description of each level, before concluding the chapter with a
discussion on the solution approach.
3.1. Modeling uncertainty. To account for regulatory uncertainty within the
decision process, we make use of a stochastic optimization approach as described in
Birge and Louveaux (2011). This means that we consider a set of decisions that
have to be taken without full information on a random event. After realization of
the uncertain event, full information about the random event is received and the
remaining variables are decided upon. These variables can be determined optimally
for each realization of the uncertain event. In the literature, uncertainty is usually
integrated in the form of an uncertain realization of parameters such as costs,
demand or production quantities (van der Weijde and Hobbs 2012; Baringo and
Conejo 2013; Ehrenmann and Smeers 2011). In our case, however, uncertainty
refers to different realizations of market designs, i.e., the spot market is divided
into an uncertain number of bidding zones. To model this structural uncertainty
about the market design, we introduce the discrete scenario set S, which includes a
finite number of possible market design scenarios s. More specifically, each scenario
represents a certain zonal configuration with a given number and location of zones.
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Each of these scenarios s ∈ S occurs with a probability pis ∈ [0, 1]. Short-term
variables such as spot market trading and redispatch are determined optimally
for each scenario s ∈ S after the regulator has decided on the zonal configuration
of the market. Long-term variables, such as investment decisions in transmission
and generation capacity, in contrast, have to be made under uncertainty by taking
into account the expected value of the random events. All restrictions including
uncertain parameters have to be feasible for all scenarios s ∈ S, i.e., the solution is
then robust with respect to feasibility.
3.2. Basic economic and technical setup. In this section, we introduce the
basic setup for our model. We consider an electricity transmission network G,
consisting of nodes N and transmission lines L ⊆ N × N . The set of lines L is
furthermore divided into existing lines Lex and candidate lines Lnew. The decision
about investment in candidate transmission line l ∈ Lnew is taken by the TSO and
denoted by zl ∈ {0, 1}. We assume that transmission investment is a naturally
discrete decision. Line investment cost are denoted by cinvl > 0. We further account
for different bidding zones Zs := {Z1, . . . , Z|Zs|}, which form a partition of the node
set N = Z1∪ . . .∪Z|Zs|, where number and configuration of bidding zones depend on
scenario s ∈ S. Lines that connect nodes of different zones are called inter-zonal lines
and denoted by Linters . Note that the set of inter-zonal lines depends on scenario
s ∈ S, as a line can be an inter-zonal line for some zonal configurations, while
it is not for others. The specific capacity of each line is denoted by f¯l and their
susceptance by Bl. We further denote sets of in- and outgoing lines by δinN ′ and δoutN ′ ,
respectively. The time horizon is discretized to a set of equidistant operating points
t ∈ T , with T = {1, . . . , |T |} and time steps τ = ti+1 − ti for all i = 1, . . . , |T | − 1.
Flows through line l in operation point t ∈ T and scenario s ∈ S are denoted by
ft,l,s. We model real power flows via a lossless direct current (DC) approximation
(Schweppe et al. 1988). Demand at each node n ∈ N is denoted by dt,n and modeled
as a continuous, strictly decreasing and linear demand function pt,n,s = pt,n,s(dt,n,s).
As a result, the gross consumer surplus is a strictly concave quadratic function:∫ dt,n,s
0
pt,n,s(ξ) dξ.
Note that prices and demand are dependent of the zonal configuration, and thus
indirectly depend on the realization of the random bidding zone configuration. At
each node n ∈ N , we introduce a finite set of generators Galln . For simplicity, all
generators of the same technology that are located at the same node are aggregated.
Firms can invest in generators g ∈ Gprivn ⊆ Galln with capacity y¯g at investment
cost cinvg > 0. Additionally, the TSO can invest in backup generators g ∈ Gbun ⊆ Galln ,
which can be used in case generation redispatch of private firms does not suffice
to alleviate network congestion. In summary, Galln = Gprivn ∪ Gbun . Furthermore,
all generators have variable cost cvarg > 0. For every generator g ∈ Gprivn , n ∈ N ,
generated quantities are denoted by yt,g,s and depend on the zonal configuration
s ∈ S. The availability factor αg ∈ [0, 1] denotes power generation per unit of
capacity. We denote production quantities that belong to the spot market and
redispatch level by the super-index “spot” and “redi”, respectively.
Note that investments are taken for a certain time frame T and thus investment
costs have to be scaled to fit the respective timeline.
3.3. First-level problem: transmission line expansion and investment in
backup capacity. At the first level, the regulator decides about optimal transmis-
sion capacity investment and investment in backup capacity as to maximize welfare.
Welfare is given by the difference of gross consumer surplus and total system costs,
i.e., variable costs of production and investment costs for generation capacity and
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transmission line expansion. The decisions about transmission line expansion and
generation capacity investment have to be taken under uncertainty before one of the
possible market design scenarios occurs. As an alternative market design influences
the outcomes of spot market trading and thus welfare levels, the TSO takes into
account the expected value of the latter to account for uncertainty. We obtain the
following first-level objective:
ψ1 :=
∑
s∈S
pis
∑
n∈N
∑
t∈T
τ
∫ dt,n,s
0
pt,n,s(ξ) dξ −
∑
g∈Galln
cvarg y
redi
t,g,s

−
∑
l∈Lnew
cinvl zl −
∑
n∈N
∑
g∈Galln
cinvg y¯g.
The first-level problem thus reads
max
zl,y¯g,g∈Gbun
ψ1
s.t. zl ∈ {0, 1} for all l ∈ Lnew.
3.4. Second-level problem: generation investment and spot market trad-
ing. At the second level, we model investment in generation capacity and spot
market trading by private firms. These decisions are taken to maximize individual
profits. We assume perfectly competitive markets, i.e., all companies are price
takers. This is a common assumption in electricity market modeling (Boucher and
Smeers 2001; Daxhelet and Smeers 2007; Grimm et al. 2016a). In the absence of
strategic behavior, profit maximization of each firm yields a welfare-maximizing
outcome (Grimm et al. 2019). We can thus consider the outcome-equivalent welfare
maximization problem. Decisions about investment in generation capacity are taken
under uncertainty, taking into consideration the expected value of spot market
outcomes. The investment decision is based on the expected spot market outcomes,
where the different market designs enter the objective function with their respective
probabilities. The second-level objective thus reads:
ψ2 :=
∑
s∈S
pis
∑
n∈N
∑
t∈T
τ
∫ dt,n,s
0
pt,n,s(ξ) dξ −
∑
g∈Gprivn
cvarg y
spot
t,g,s
−∑
n∈N
∑
g∈Gprivn
cinvg y¯g.
The production yspott,g,s of each generator g ∈ G is restricted by its capacity limit
y¯g and it is possible to restrict investment in generation capacity up to a maximum
capacity y¯ubg :
yspott,g,s ≤ αg y¯g for all n ∈ N, g ∈ Gprivn , t ∈ T, s ∈ S (1)
y¯g ≤ y¯ubg for all n ∈ N, g ∈ Gprivn , t ∈ T, s ∈ S. (2)
When deciding about investment in generation capacity and production quantities
during spot market trading, firms only receive regional price signals in case inter-
zonal lines are congested. Intra-zonal lines are neglected during spot market trading.
As a result, in a market setup where all nodes form a single bidding zone, no
transmission capacities are considered and thus firms do not receive any regional
price signals. However, in a scenario where the market is split into two or more
bidding zones, firms can receive zonal price signals in case of constraints on the inter-
zonal trade capacity. We account for this structural uncertainty by implementing
a zonal version of Kirchhoff’s first law, where the number and configuration of
inter-zonal lines depend on the respective market design scenario:
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∑
n∈N∩Zk
dt,n,s =
∑
n∈N∩Zk
∑
g∈Gprivn
yspott,g,s +
∑
l∈δin
Zk
(L)
f spott,l,s −
∑
l∈δout
Zk
(L)
f spott,l,s (3)
for all Zk ∈ Zs, t ∈ T, s ∈ S. Equation (3) coincides with standard market clearing in
case there is only one zone. In case of several zones where at least one zone contains
more than one node, equation (3) requires market clearing in each zone. This
formulation allows for our structural market design uncertainty to be incorporated.
Flows on inter-zonal lines are restricted by the trade capacity, which is the thermal
capacity of each line, scaled with a security factor βl ∈ [0, 1]:
− βlf¯l ≤ f spott,l,s ≤ βlf¯l for all l ∈ Linters ∩ Lex, t ∈ T, s ∈ S (4)
− zlβlf¯l ≤ f spott,l,s ≤ zlβlf¯l for all l ∈ Linters ∩ Lnew, t ∈ T, s ∈ S. (5)
Note that Kirchhoff’s second law is not considered at the spot market level.
Finally, we impose variable bounds on demand and production quantities:
yspott,g,s ≥ 0 for all n ∈ N, g ∈ Gprivn , t ∈ T, s ∈ S (6)
dt,n,s ≥ 0 for all n ∈ N, t ∈ T, s ∈ S. (7)
To summarize, at level two we consider the welfare maximizing generation
investment decisions under uncertainty and deterministic, scenario-dependent supply
decisions, where supply is constrained by generation capacities and inter-zonal
transmission capacities. We thus obtain the following second-level problem:
max
yspott,g,s,dt,n,s,y¯g
ψ2 s.t. (3), (4)–(7).
We end up with a concave-quadratic maximization problem with linear constraints.
All discrete variables that appear at the second level are decided upon in the first
level.
Note that it is also possible to consider a nodal design as a possible scenario.
Then, Kirchhoff’s first and second law would need to be accounted for in level 2.
3.5. Third-level problem: cost-optimal redispatch. At the third level, cost-
based redispatch is carried out at minimum costs, i.e., the TSO reallocates spot
market supply to ensure feasibility with respect to transmission constraints. This
is done for each scenario, after the market design has been decided upon. Only in
case reallocation of spot market supply does not suffice to resolve infeasibilities, the
TSO has the possibility to ramp up backup generation capacity to ensure feasibility.
Total redispatch costs are given by
ψ3,s :=
∑
n∈N
∑
t∈T
τ
∑
g∈Galln
cvarg
(
yredit,g,s − yspott,g,s
)
.
During redispatch, generation volumes can be altered by the TSO. These are
short-run decisions and thus depend on the respective market design scenario s ∈ S.
Trade flows need to account for Kirchhoff’s first law, ensuring power balance at
each node:
dt,n,s =
∑
g∈Gprivn
yredit,g,s +
∑
l∈δinn (L)
f redit,l,s −
∑
l∈δoutn (L)
f redit,l,s (8)
for all n ∈ N, t ∈ T, s ∈ S.
Besides Kirchhoff’s first law as given in equation (8), redispatch also has to
account for Kirchhoff’s second law, which determines the distribution of residual
load at one node across its adjacent transmission lines. This is modeled according
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to the linear DC-lossless approach developed by Schweppe et al. (1988), which
determines voltage angles θt,n,s, t ∈ T, n ∈ N, s ∈ S:
f redit,l,s −Bl(θt,n,s − θt,j,s) = 0 for all l = (n, j) ∈ Lex, t ∈ T, s ∈ S (9)
−Ml(1− zl) ≤ f redit,l,s −Bl(θt,n,s − θt,j,s) ≤Ml(1− zl) (10)
for all l = (n, j) ∈ Lnew, t ∈ T, s ∈ S, where Ml is a sufficiently large number.
To obtain unique physical solutions, we fix the voltage angle at an arbitrary node
nˆ ∈ N :
θt,nˆ,s = 0 for all t ∈ T, s ∈ S. (11)
Furthermore, the power flow on all lines is restricted by the thermal capacity:
− f¯l ≤ f redit,l,s ≤ f¯l for all l ∈ Lex, t ∈ T, s ∈ S (12)
− zlf¯l ≤ f redit,l,s ≤ zlf¯l for all l ∈ Lnew, t ∈ T, s ∈ S. (13)
Applying generation capacity limits and variable bounds analogously to level two,
we obtain the following third-level problem formulation:
min
yredit,g,s
ψ3,s s.t. (1), (6), (8), (9)–(13),
where we replaced yspott,g,s in (1) and (6) by the redispatch variables yredit,g,s and the set
Gprivn by Galln . We obtain a linear minimization problem over linear constraints.
3.6. Model discussion and solution approach. Considering all three levels, we
obtain a mixed-integer nonlinear trilevel optimization model. In this section, we
describe how we transform the model to an equivalent bilevel problem and solve the
reformulated model to global optimality. Figure 3 illustrates the general structure
of the model in technical terms, where Xi and Wi,s are deterministic and random
variables, respectively, of level i, and Ωi and Ψi,s denote the feasible sets of Xi and
Wi,s, respectively, of level i.
Figure 3. Schematic representation of the trilevel market model
max
X1
ψ1(X1, X2) + Es [ψ1(W2,s,W3,s)]
s.t. X1 ∈ Ω1,
max
X2,W2,s
ψ2(X2) + Es [ψ2(W2,s)]
s.t. (X1, X2) ∈ Ω2,
W2,s ∈ Ψ2,s for all s ∈ S,
min
W3,s
ψ3,s(W2,s,W3,s)
s.t. (W2,s,W3,s) ∈ Ψ3,s for all s ∈ S
In general, such multilevel mixed-integer nonlinear models are intractable (Dempe
et al. 2015). To be able to solve instances of relevant sizes, problem-tailored solution
approaches need to be developed. Therefore, we exploit the specific problem
structure of our model to reformulate the trilevel market model as an equivalent
mixed-integer bilevel model with concave-quadratic objectives at both levels. We
adapt the reformulation used for a similar setting in Grimm et al. (2016a) to apply
it to the stochastic model formulation. This reformulation builds upon the weak
coupling of the trilevel model as described in Section 2.2. Level 2 only depends on
discrete line investment variables of the first level for two reasons: first, only the
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TSO carries out investment in and dispatch of backup capacity, in case redispatch
of private generation capacity does not suffice. Thus, backup does not affect spot
market decisions. Second, we assume cost-based redispatch, which means that firms
do not receive additional rents in the third stage. Consequently, the interconnection
of level 2 and 3 is purely driven by line investment variables from level 1.
We exploit this weak coupling by decomposing our model in the following way:
we fix line investment variables in the second level and solve it for every possible
realization of line investment scenarios.
Note that uniqueness of the solution for given line investment is not ensured in
case generation technologies have the same investment and production costs (Grimm
et al. 2017). In order to ensure a unique solution of the level 2 problem, we apply
the following tie-breaking rule: in case several generators in one bidding zone have
the same investment and production costs, investment in this technology across
all nodes in the zone is divided proportionally to the maximum capacity allowed
at node n ∈ N . In case there is no upper limit, investment is simply divided up
equally across all nodes in the respective zone. Analogously, production is divided
proportionally to the capacity at node n ∈ N in case there are generators with the
same variable production cost in one zone.
We then insert spot market outcomes into level 1 and 3 to compute the remaining
first- and third level solutions that do not affect spot market outcomes. We thus
end up with a master problem consisting of the first and the third level with a
reduced number of variables, and a single-level sub-problem consisting of level 2. We
now show how the master problem can be transformed into a single-level problem
and thus be solved efficiently. To this end, we use the following model property.
Consider the objective functions ψ1 and ψ3,s of level 1 and 3, respectively. It holds
that
ψ1 =
∑
s∈S
pis
−ψ3,s + ∑
n∈N
∑
t∈T
(∫ dt,n,s
0
pt,n,s(ξ) dξ −
∑
g∈Galln
cvarg y
spot
t,g,s
)
−
∑
n∈N
∑
g∈Galln
cinvg y¯g −
∑
l∈Lnew
cinvl zl.
(14)
Equation (14) reveals that the objective functions of level 1 and 3 differ by a term
that only depends on first- and second-level variables, i.e., line investment and
spot market variables. More explicitly, this implies that the first- and the third-
level problems have affine equivalent objective functions and thus have identical
optimization directions. Therefore, we can reformulate the original trilevel model
into the following equivalent bilevel model:
max ψ1(X1, X2) + Es [ψ1(W2,s,W3,s)] (15)
s.t. X1 ∈ Ω1, (W2,s,W3,s) ∈ Ψ3,s for all s ∈ S,
(X1, X2,W2,s) ∈ argmax{ψ2(X2) + Es [ψ2(W2,s)] : (X1, X2) ∈ Ω2,
W2,s ∈ Ψ2,s for all s ∈ S}.
As shown in (15), the master- and the sub-problem are only coupled by transmission
line investment. Fixing these variables yields decoupled models that can be solved
separately. As line investment zl ∈ {0, 1}, l ∈ Lnew is discrete, we iterate over all
possible line investment scenarios.1 The detailed reformulated bilevel problem can
be found in Appendix B.
1In a slightly modified setting, Grimm et al. (2019) furthermore propose replacing the result-
ing bilevel problem by an equivalent single-level problem using a Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)
reformulation for the lower level (Dempe and Zemkoho 2013), which can be solved with standard
solvers. It has been shown, however, that this approach leads to a numerically more complicated
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4. Two-node example
The model as well as the iterative solution method described in Section 3 have
been implemented in General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) Release 25.1.3
(GAMS Development Corporation 2018). All models that need to be solved are
either mixed integer quadratic programs or linear programs and were solved with
Gurobi 8.1.0 (Gurobi Optimization 2019).
In this section, the effect of regulatory uncertainty on investment decisions, welfare
levels, electricity prices, distribution of rents, and expected profits is addressed in a
stylized two-node example. We consider two possible scenarios on market design:
one, in which the market consists of a single bidding zone, including both nodes;
and a second scenario, in which the market is divided into two bidding zones and
each node represents one of the two zones. There is regulatory uncertainty for
market participants regarding which of the two market designs will be implemented.
This uncertainty is parametrized through a common probability distribution of
market participants over the possible designs of bidding zones. To show the effect of
regulatory uncertainty in a system with different levels of renewables investment, we
set up two sets of input data with a low and high CO2 allowance price, respectively:
i) case A with a moderate CO2 allowance price of 15 e/t,
ii) case B with a higher CO2 allowance price of 35 e/t.
Note that in each case, both nodes face the same allowance price.
4.1. Operating points for demand and generation. Applying a greenfield
approach, we do not account for any existing capacity. All quantitative values in
the two-node example refer to a system peak demand of 1 MW, whereof node 1 has
a demand share of 30% compared to 70% at node 2 (see Figure 4). The temporal
resolution has 400 operating points, which occur at different frequency and scale
to one representative year: there are two seasons (winter and summer) with forty
different demand levels each, t1 (highest winter peak) to t40 (lowest winter off-peak)
and t41 (highest summer peak) to t80 (lowest summer off-peak). These multiply
with five different availability levels for wind power, w1 (highest) to w5 (lowest).
Table 1 states the respective frequency of the operating points, while Table 4 in
Appendix A provides a reference demand level, a reference price, and an availability
factor for wind power for each operating point. Linear demand functions at each
node are then derived for each operating point with the help of reference demand,
reference price, and a point elasticity of demand ( = −0.1).
Table 1. Structure of operating points with respective frequency
No Entries (frequency)
Seasons 2 winter (0.5), summer (0.5)
Hours 40 t1–t40 (0.0125)
Wind 5 w1 (0.05), w2 (0.2), w3 (0.5), w4 (0.2), w5 (0.05)
4.2. Economic parameters for generation technologies. The economic pa-
rameters in Figure 4 state the annualized investment costs cinvc > 0 and variable
generation costs cvarc ≥ 0 of wind power and conventional power stations fired by coal
and natural gas (i.e., combined-cycle gas turbines (CCGT) and gas turbines (GT))
single-level model with long computation times, which was also the case for our model setup. Note
that, as both methods yield globally optimal solutions, the same results are obtained in both cases.
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in case c ∈ {A,B}.2,3 Coal and wind power plants have the highest fixed costs,
followed by CCGT and GT. The assumption of worse wind conditions at node 2
is represented with a markup on investment costs, whereas both nodes have equal
availability factors (i.e., the same generation pattern) for one operating point.
The different levels of the CO2 prices affect the variable generation costs of
conventional power plants, whereas wind power always has variable costs of zero.
We further assume that coal is more expensive at node 2 (e.g., due to an additional
markup for regional coal transport), resulting in higher variable costs of coal
generation compared to node 1. In case A, the conventional technology with lowest
variable generation costs is coal, followed by CCGT, and GT. In case B, which
implies a higher CO2 price, generation companies choose between CCGT (always
being more profitable than coal), GT, and wind power plants.
Figure 4. Illustration of two-node example with annualized
investment costs cinvc and variable generation costs cvarc
Wind:
cinv = 78 000 e/MW
cvar = 0 e/MWh
Coal:
cinv = 93 000 e/MW
cvarA = 35 e/MWh
cvarB = 51 e/MWh
Wind:
cinv = 93 000 e/MW
cvar = 0 e/MWh
Coal:
cinv = 93 000 e/MW
cvarA = 38 e/MWh
cvarB = 54 e/MWh
CCGT:
cinv = 58 000 e/MW
cvarA = 43 e/MWh
cvarB = 50 e/MWh
GT:
cinv = 32 000 e/MW
cvarA = 68 e/MWh
cvarB = 79 e/MWh
CCGT:
cinv = 58 000 e/MW
cvarA = 43 e/MWh
cvarB = 50 e/MWh
GT:
cinv = 32 000 e/MW
cvarA = 68 e/MWh
cvarB = 79 e/MWh
1
Demand share: 0.3
2
Demand share: 0.7
4.3. Network expansion. The TSO can invest in line capacity between node 1
and node 2 in incremental steps of 0.01 MW. Annualized fixed costs for transmission
investment of 1 MW are 25,000 e.
2To calculate annualized investment costs, we assume overnight investment costs of
1 600 Te/MW for coal, 1 000 Te/MW for CCGT, 500 Te/MW for GT, and 1 200 Te/MW
for wind at node 1 (1 440 Te/MW at node 2 including a markup of +20%). We further assume
depreciation periods of 40 years for coal and CCGT and 30 years for GT and wind power plants
and an interest rate of 5%. As an alternative to load shedding, the TSO has the possibility to
contract capacity of GT outside the spot market at the same investment and variable costs.
3Variable generation costs of conventional technologies follow these assumptions: a hard coal
price of 85.0 e/t (about 10.4 e/MWhth), a natural gas price of 21 e/MWhth, and a price for
CO2 emission allowances of 15 e/t for case A and 35 e/t for case B. Efficiency factors are 45% for
coal, 55% for CCGT, and 35% for GT, resulting in specific CO2 emissions of 800 g/kWhel for coal,
340 g/kWhel for CCGT, and 535 g/kWhel for GT.
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5. Results
In the following, we discuss to what extent regulatory uncertainty affects level
and distribution of investments, welfare, prices, and profits. We take the perspective
that one bidding zone is in place and there is uncertainty about whether or not
it will be split into two zones in the future. Of course, the reasoning would also
be possible vice versa with the possibility to reduce the number of bidding zones.4
We evaluate the model for a discrete set of probabilities that market participants
(the TSO and private investors) assume for the implementation of two bidding
zones, i.e., P (k = 2) ∈ {0, 0.1, . . . , 1}. In order to keep runtimes short, we do not
increase the resolution any further, as this would not significantly change the results.
Market participants expect the implementation of either one or two bidding zones,
i.e. P (k = 1) + P (k = 2) = 1. When P (k = 2) = 0.0, market participants are
certain to see one bidding zone in the future, whereas for P (k = 2) = 1.0, they are
certain that two bidding zones will be in place.
5.1. Investment in generation and transmission.
Result 1. Expectations that the market design changes from one to two bidding
zones affect the location as well as the technology of generation capacity and also
the level of transmission capacity. Consequently, not only the implementation but
also the expectation of zonal reconfiguration has quantifiable economic effects.
Figure 5 (case A) and Figure 6 (case B) give an overview on decisions on
investment in generation and transmission capacity for different probabilities. At
this point, results only depend on the expectation to end up with either one or
two bidding zones and not on the later choice on the bidding zone design by the
regulator.
For P (k = 2) = 0.0, gas-fired power plants are equally distributed across both
nodes according to the tie-breaking rule in the model description. This is an
exogenous assumption following their equal investment and variable production cost
throughout all nodes. In contrast, wind power plants have regionally differentiated
investment costs and coal power plants have regionally differentiated variable costs.
In expectation of one bidding zone, generation companies invest in wind and coal
capacity only at node 1 due to their lower nodal costs. While case A sees a
combination of coal and wind power, the higher CO2 price in case B leads to more
investment in wind power and CCGT but none in coal-fired power plants. Overall
investment in generation capacity is higher in case B (2.23 MW) compared to case A
(1.58 MW) due to the low guaranteed availability of wind capacity.
For P (k = 2) = 1.0, locally differentiated spot market prices reflect spatial scarci-
ties. The TSO anticipates that its investment decision on the level of transmission
capacity alters investment decisions of generation companies. As a result, the TSO
reduces its investment in transmission capacity to about 55% of the initial level.
With the expectation of two bidding zones, generation investment in gas-fired power
plants shifts to a large extent to node 2 and increases for CCGT, while investment
in coal and wind power plants decreases at node 1. Further, node 2 receives a small
share of investment in coal capacity (case A) and wind capacity (case B).
For case A, Figure 5 summarizes investment decisions for different values of
P (k = 2).5 We observe that assigning even a relatively small probability to two
bidding zones provides incentives for the relocation of most gas-fired generation ca-
pacity to node 2. The reason is that gas-fired power plants have the same investment
4An example are the entry-exit zones in European gas markets with an ongoing development of
bidding zone reductions.
5For 0 < P (k = 2) < 1, the TSO contracts backup capacity of about 0.01 MW at node 2.
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and variable costs at both nodes. Therefore, even a very low probability for the
occurrence of two bidding zones eliminates the indifference and incentivizes a shift of
investment to node 2, where electricity prices are higher in the case of two bidding
zones. The majority of coal and all wind power plants, which have a more favorable
cost structure at node 1, are located at node 1 for all P (k = 2) ∈ {0, 0.1, . . . , 1}. For
an increasing probability up to P (k = 2) ≤ 0.6, coal and wind capacity at node 1
slightly decreases compared to the benchmark (P (k = 2) = 0.0), while more CCGT
capacity is built at node 2. Only for P (k = 2) ≥ 0.7, generation companies invest
in small amounts of coal capacity at node 2. In general, the capacity of coal and
wind power plants decreases for higher probabilities P (k = 2), while CCGT capacity
increases, leading not only to a different locational distribution, but also to a change
in technology.
The relocation of generation capacity closer to load centers at node 2, already for
P (k = 2) = 0.1, goes along with significant reductions in transmission investment.
Except for the initial reduction from 0.61 MW to 0.45 MW at P (k = 2) = 0.1 and
a small step with the relocation of some coal capacity to node 2 at P (k = 2) = 0.7,
transmission capacity decreases steadily for increasing P (k = 2), reaching 0.35 MW
at P (k = 2) = 1.0.
Figure 5. Generation and network capacity (case A)
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(b) Transmission investment
In case B (Figure 6), wind power is the technology with lowest average generation
costs and generation companies invest in 1.43 MW of wind power plants at node 1 for
P (k = 2) = 0.0. Due to its varying availability, the installed wind capacity does not
supply the entire electricity demand in all operating points, resulting in additional
investment in CCGT and GT capacity. Compared to case A, higher overall CCGT
investment leads to more generation capacity at node 2 after tie-breaking investment
to both nodes at P (k = 2) = 0.0. Together with the complementary character in
the utilization of network capacity for wind and CCGT at node 1, this allows for
lower investment in transmission capacity.
Compared to case A, low probabilities for P (k = 2) only have a minor impact
on investment in generation and transmission capacity. Some gas-fired capacity is
relocated to node 2 but the effect is less prominent. For increasing P (k = 2), wind
capacity at node 1 constantly reduces to 1.30 MW at P (k = 2) = 0.7, decreasing
overall installed generation capacity. At P (k = 2) = 0.8, a structural change takes
place as investment in wind power capacity at node 2 (0.24 MW) replaces some wind
power capacity at node 1 (0.31 MW). Even higher P (k = 2) imply an additional,
yet small relocation of wind power from node 1 to node 2, resulting in total wind
power capacity of 1.24 MW for P (k = 2) = 1.0.
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Transmission investment decreases monotonically, yet on limited scale from
0.50 MW to 0.43 MW until P (k = 2) = 0.7 and only at P (k = 2) = 0.8 it substan-
tially decreases to 0.27 MW. Again, higher probabilities P (k = 2) entail an altered
regional distribution and a change in technology for generation investment with less
wind and more CCGT in the generation mix.
Figure 6. Generation and network capacity (case B)
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5.2. Market results.
Result 2. In case of regulatory uncertainty, a perceived positive probability of zonal
reconfiguration from one to two bidding zones leads to welfare gains independently
from the regulator’s ultimate decision on the zonal configuration. This is mainly due
to more efficient long-run investment decisions that anticipate a possible change of
the market design. Importantly, this anticipation effect reduces possible additional
welfare gains upon the actual implementation of two bidding zones considerably.
Welfare effects. Figure 7 illustrates welfare changes after the implementation of
one or two bidding zones as compared to a benchmark scenario, where one zone
is anticipated and also implemented. General results for both cases are, that
introducing two bidding zones without any anticipation by market participants
yields comparably low welfare gains. A strictly positive expectation of two bidding
zones by the TSO and generation companies leads to a higher welfare level, in which
case the implementation of two bidding zones yields additional welfare gains. Highest
welfare levels result from P (k = 2) = 1.0 and k = 2, due to the right assumption of
the TSO and generation companies on the implemented bidding zone design, when
deciding on investment, combined with a more efficient market dispatch after the
implementation of two bidding zones.
For case A, even a relatively low probability for implementing two zones already
leads to high welfare gains, mainly due a more efficient relocation of CCGT and
GT capacity (at no additional cost) and less network investment. Probabilities
P (k = 2) > 0.1 lead to additional monotonically increasing welfare gains with
respect to the benchmark scenario. We also observe that for a given probability
P (k = 2), welfare gains with respect to the benchmark case are relatively similar
for k = 1 and k = 2. This indicates that most welfare gains result from changes in
transmission and generation investment (taken under uncertainty), while the later
decision by the regulator for either one or two bidding zones has limited effects on
welfare.
In case B, welfare gains from investment decisions are significantly lower than
in case A (with respect to the benchmark case), as investment for P (k = 2) = 0.0
is already more efficient with higher levels of gas-fired capacity at node 2 and less
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network investment. Instead, the welfare gains following the implementation of
two zones (k = 2) are several times higher than in case A for a given probability
P (k = 2) > 0. This illustrates that welfare gains only partly occur due to a more
efficient location of generation capacity, and a large part depends on regionally
efficient market results during spot market trading.
Figure 7. Welfare for implementation one and two bidding zones
A value of 1 e/MWh translates into annual welfare gains of 1 million e for
1 TWh in annual electricity demand
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Spot market prices. With higher expectations for two bidding zones, average spot
market prices mostly increase (Figure 8) while network fees decrease (Figure 9).
With the implementation of one bidding zone (k=1), investment decisions (taken
in anticipation of two bidding zones) increase electricity spot market prices by almost
2 e/MWh in both cases for high values of P (k = 2). While consumers in case A
can more than compensate the additional expenses in the spot market with lower
network fees for low P (k = 2), this does not hold for higher probabilities and in
case B.
With the implementation of two bidding zones (k=2), spot market prices are
1-2 e/MWh lower (higher) at node 1 (node 2) compared to the implementation of
one bidding zone. Reasons are the change from technologies with lower variable
production cost at node 1 to technologies with higher variable costs closer to the
demand center at node 2 and a reduction in network investment. This leads to
network constraints and zonal price differences in some operating points. The
general price trend is upwards for an increasing expectation to see two bidding
zones. Exceptions are, that node 1 sees a drop in average spot market prices for
low P (k = 2) and prices at node 2 start to decrease for high P (k = 2) which
reduces price spreads. Compared to the benchmark scenario, network fees decline
steeply for low P (k = 2) ≤ 0.2, reach even negative levels for higher P (k = 2) by
collecting congestion rents on trade between the two zones, and settle at 0 e/MWh
for P (k = 2) = 1.
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Figure 8. Average, demand-weighted spot market prices
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Figure 9. Additional network fees including network costs,
balancing cost, and network congestion rents
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5.3. Distributional effects.
Result 3. Regulatory uncertainty leads to distributional effects (as compared to the
case without regulatory uncertainty) that are due to its effect on investment decisions
and, thus, market outcomes. In particular generation technologies with relatively
high investment costs are prone to economic risk.
Stakeholder rents. Figures 10–11 show the different welfare components in more
detail. With the implementation of one bidding zone, consumer surplus decreases
and producer surplus increases with higher probabilities for P (k = 2). The reason
is the change in technology from coal and wind at node 1 to CCGT at node 2 (see
Section 5.1) at higher probabilities for two bidding zones. Electricity generation
becomes more expensive (prices go up) while overall costs for transmission infras-
tructure and redispatch decreases (positive other welfare gains). In case B, the
positive other effects only realize at P (k = 2) ≥ 0.8, when some wind is relocated to
node 2 and transmission investment decreases.
With the implementation of two bidding zones, prices at node 1 decrease and
consumer surplus is higher (producer surplus lower) than in the benchmark case
P (k = 2) = 0.0. In contrast, consumer surplus is lower (producer surplus higher) at
node 2 than in the benchmark case, as prices go up due to investment in generation
capacity with higher variable cost. Losses for consumers at node 2 and producers at
node 1 are significantly higher than gains by consumers at node 1 and producers at
node 2. Also, as producers adapt to two bidding zones with higher P (k = 2), welfare
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losses mostly allocate to consumers at node 2. On the other hand, most welfare
gains materialize in lower network and redispatch costs (other) and a significant
amount of congestion rents (CR).
The general distributional effects are the same for case A and case B, although
in case A it is more pronounced due to higher price differences with the initial
relocation of gas-fired power plants for low P (k = 2). Distribution effects are also
generally lower if stakeholders anticipate a zonal design correctly and with a high
probability.
Figure 10. Welfare distribution in case A
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(a) Realization: One zone
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(b) Realization: Two zones
Figure 11. Welfare distribution in case B
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(a) Realization: One zone
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(b) Realization: Two zones
Technology profits. Generation companies make their investment decision according
to their probability distribution on the expected bidding zone configuration. Under
the assumption of perfect competition, investments in all technologies at both nodes
receive zero profits in market equilibrium. This no longer holds for investments
under uncertainty after the implementation of either one or two bidding zones.
Table 2 for case A and Table 3 for case B provide profits and losses by technology
for different probabilities.
For a positive expectation of market participants to see two bidding zones and
the later implementation of one bidding zone, technologies make a profit at node 1
and a loss at node 2. Vice versa, some technologies make losses at node 1 and profits
at node 2 with the implementation of two bidding zones. For each technology at
one node, the sum of profits and losses multiplied with the respective probabilities
P (k = 1) and P (k = 2) result in an expected profit of zero.
For the implementation of one bidding zone in case A, coal and wind generators
are better off at node 1 as compared to the benchmark, whereas coal and CCGT
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at node 2 are worse off (and vice versa for two bidding zones). Most exposed is
wind, followed by coal at node 1, coal at node 2, and CCGT at node 2. In case B,
wind power is exposed to uncertainty with almost twice the possible profits and
losses than in case A, while there is no effect on CCGT capacity at both nodes. The
results indicate, that price differences due to network constraints do not occur in
operating points with peak prices as not GT but technologies with lower variable
costs are exposed to risks. In case A this includes wind, coal, and CCGT while in
case B it only affects wind.
Table 2. Generators’ profit for uncertain bidding zones (case A)
e/MWh One zone Two zones
P(k=2) windn1 coaln1 coaln2 CCGTn2 windn1 coaln1 coaln2 CCGTn2
0.0 0.00 0.00 - 0.00 -0.28 -0.14 - 0.49
0.1 0.14 0.14 - -0.15 -1.30 -1.27 - 1.09
0.2 0.31 0.29 - -0.28 -1.26 -1.22 - 0.89
0.3 0.50 0.46 - -0.38 -1.18 -1.13 - 0.71
0.4 0.73 0.65 - -0.46 -1.09 -1.03 - 0.55
0.5 0.98 0.86 - -0.51 -0.98 -0.91 - 0.41
0.6 1.27 1.08 - -0.54 -0.85 -0.76 - 0.29
0.7 1.77 1.43 -1.23 -0.57 -0.76 -0.66 0.41 0.20
0.8 2.01 1.53 -1.22 -0.60 -0.50 -0.41 0.25 0.12
0.9 2.22 1.59 -1.20 -0.65 -0.25 -0.19 0.11 0.06
1.0 2.22 1.57 -1.23 -0.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 3. Generators’ profit for uncertain bidding zones (case B)
e/MWh One zone Two zones
P(k=2) windn1 windn2 windn1 windn2
0.0 0.00 - -1.67 -
0.1 0.22 - -1.98 -
0.2 0.64 - -2.59 -
0.3 1.03 - -2.43 -
0.4 1.47 - -2.23 -
0.5 1.70 - -1.72 -
0.6 2.18 - -1.47 -
0.7 2.69 - -1.17 -
0.8 4.10 -3.91 -1.05 0.95
0.9 3.98 -4.03 -0.45 0.43
1.0 3.82 -4.31 0.00 0.00
6. Discussion
The observations above highlight several key insights. First of all, our analysis
shows that expectations about future market design are crucially important. In
some cases, even a small probability of a change in the bidding zone configuration is
enough to significantly change investment levels and realize a significant part of the
benefits of an actual market design change. This is particularly true if generation
investment and operational costs are not highly location-dependent, because in this
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case, a small probability of price divergence will tip the balance in favor of one
location. If the costs of generation are location-dependent, as they are for, e.g., wind
generators, this effect is much less pronounced. In this case, a significant probability
of diverging prices is necessary to overcome cost difference between the different
locations. In addition, if the available generation capacity varies over time, as it
does for most renewables, a probability of a market design change also has less of
an impact on welfare, as in this case a more efficient distribution of investment is
not enough – the actual change to a market design which allows for a more efficient
dispatch has significant additional benefits.
Although expectations about market design change welfare, they also have
distributional effects. In the short term, an increase in the perceived probability
of a change in market design generally decreases consumer surplus, as it leads to
higher prices. However, this is offset by a decrease in network costs, which are
usually indirectly paid for by consumers in the longer run. Different expectations
also influence how the additional gains from an actual change in market design are
distributed among consumers and producers at different locations. There are also
distributional effects between different generation technologies. Generators with
higher investment costs are most exposed to our type of regulatory uncertainty.
Our analysis also shows that structural regulatory uncertainty is fundamentally
different from parametric uncertainty about demand, costs, and other parameters
that are usually included in stochastic models. While the latter uncertainties usually
have a negative effect, increasing system costs and decreasing welfare in comparison
to a situation in which the parameters are known, structural regulatory uncertainty
can have a positive effect. This is only the case if there is probability that market
design will become more efficient. It is also not universally true; for instance, if
investors are risk averse, structural regulatory uncertainty may discourage investment
to the point where welfare is negatively affected. Nevertheless, as we have shown
above, there is a possibility that regulatory uncertainty increases welfare.
Importantly, this does not mean regulatory uncertainty can be used as a long-term
policy tool, as expectations cannot consistently diverge from reality. It is, however,
something that policy makers and regulators should be aware of, as regulatory
uncertainty can have a significant impact on markets. In our particular example,
if market participants believe that there is a nonzero probability of a change from
uniform to zonal pricing, part of the benefits from this change are already realized,
regardless of whether or not it actually happens. This implies that the actual
benefits of a change in market design may be lower than expected. Importantly, it
also implies that as long as policy makers are themselves unsure about policies that
increase market efficiency, they should not try to shut down the wide debate about
these, as this debate may already have positive effects.
Naturally, our approach has limitations. We have considered a small model in
which market design is the only source of uncertainty. In the real world, there is
additional uncertainty about a wide range of other variables and structures. There
are also other market inefficiencies. All of this means that the additional effect
of regulatory uncertainty may be smaller. In addition, we assume that market
participants are risk-neutral. In reality, market participants are likely to be risk
averse, which will increase the impact of uncertainty on investment levels and spatial
distributions. Finally, in our model, we only have one investment stage. This may
overstate the impact of uncertainty on investment, as compared to a situation in
which investments are made continuously, with options to wait or adjust.
All these issues are worth investigating further. Nevertheless, we expect our
qualitative findings to carry over to larger, more complex, and more realistic settings.
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7. Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed a novel method for including structural regulatory
uncertainty about market design in a multilevel electricity market model with
transmission and generation investment and have applied it to a stylized two node
example studying the effect of uncertainty on market outcomes.
This analysis yields various insights. First, our qualitative results show that some
of the welfare gain from a switch to a more efficient market design might already
be realized before the actual implementation, if market participants anticipate the
market design change. Market participants’ beliefs about future bidding zones should
therefore not be ignored in the discussion on bidding zone topology. Second, even
small probabilities for the expectation of a change in market design can lead to more
efficient generation and transmission investment. The welfare gains increase with
higher expectations of a switch to a more efficient system. Third, we observe that
risk is not distributed equally between market participants: in general, generators
with high investment costs carry the risk of investing not the right quantity and in
the wrong locations, while generators with lower investment costs are not affected
negatively by uncertainty.
When considering implementing a change to a more efficient market design, policy
makers should be aware of the fact that part of the welfare gains might already have
been realized due to a period of uncertainty preceding the actual implementation.
At the same time, deliberately inducing uncertainty cannot be used as a policy tool
by the regulators in the long run, as expectations and realizations cannot indefinitely
diverge.
To adequately assess and disentangle the different effects of uncertainty, we have
applied our model to a small network with simplifying assumptions. Future work
could address a more realistic representation of an existing electricity system, to
quantify results and verify that they carry over to real-world networks.
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Appendix A. Assumptions for two node example
Table 4. 80 operating points for demand with reference demand
and reference price as well as a probability of 1.25% each (winter:
t1–t40 and summer: t41–t80). Five times (w1–w5) the 80 operating
points for different wind availability (winter/summer) and with
different probabilities.
Winter/Summer Ref Demand Ref price w1 w2 w3 w4 w5
[MW] [EUR/MWh] 5% 20% 50% 20% 5%
t1 / t41 1.0000 / 0.9500 250 / 100
t2 / t42 0.9750 / 0.9250 175 / 75
t3 / t43 0.9500 / 0.9000 100 / 65
t4 / t44 0.9250 / 0.8750 75 / 45
t5 / t45 0.9136 / 0.8636 70 / 40
t6 / t46 0.9023 / 0.8523 65 / 40
t7 / t47 0.8909 / 0.8409 50 / 40
t8 / t48 0.8795 / 0.8295 45 / 40
t9 / t49 0.8682 / 0.8182 40 / 40
t10 / t50 0.8568 / 0.8068 40 / 40
t11 / t51 0.8455 / 0.7955 40 / 40
t12 / t52 0.8341 / 0.7841 40 / 40
t13 / t53 0.8227 / 0.7727 40 / 40
t14 / t54 0.8114 / 0.7614 40 / 40
t15 / t55 0.8000 / 0.7500 40 / 40
t16 / t56 0.7886 / 0.7386 40 / 40
t17 / t57 0.7773 / 0.7273 40 / 40
t18 / t58 0.7659 / 0.7159 40 / 40
t19 / t59 0.7545 / 0.7045 40 / 40
t20 / t60 0.7432 / 0.6932 40 / 40 0.81/ 0.52/ 0.22/ 0.07/ 0.02/
t21 / t61 0.7318 / 0.6818 40 / 40 0.46 0.34 0.14 0.04 0.01
t22 / t62 0.7205 / 0.6705 40 / 40
t23 / t63 0.7091 / 0.6591 40 / 40
t24 / t64 0.6977 / 0.6477 40 / 40
t25 / t65 0.6864 / 0.6364 40 / 40
t26 / t66 0.6750 / 0.6250 40 / 40
t27 / t67 0.6636 / 0.6136 40 / 40
t28 / t68 0.6523 / 0.6023 40 / 40
t29 / t69 0.6409 / 0.5909 40 / 40
t30 / t70 0.6295 / 0.5795 40 / 40
t31 / t71 0.6182 / 0.5682 40 / 40
t32 / t72 0.6068 / 0.5568 40 / 40
t33 / t73 0.5955 / 0.5455 40 / 40
t34 / t74 0.5841 / 0.5341 40 / 40
t35 / t75 0.5727 / 0.5227 40 / 40
t36 / t76 0.5614 / 0.5114 40 / 40
t37 / t77 0.5500 / 0.5000 40 / 40
t38 / t78 0.5250 / 0.4750 40 / 40
t39 / t79 0.5000 / 0.4500 40 / 40
t40 / t80 0.4750 / 0.4250 40 / 40
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Appendix B. The reduced Twolevel Power Market Model
B.1. Spot Market Level: Optimal Generation Investment and Spot Mar-
ket Behavior.
max
∑
s∈S
pis
∑
n∈N
∑
t∈T
τ
∫ dt,n,s
0
pt,n,s(ξ) dξ +
∑
g∈Gprivn
cvarg y
spot
t,g,s
−∑
n∈N
∑
g∈Gprivn
cinvg y¯g
s.t. Generation Capacity Limits (GCL):
yspott,g,s ≤ αgτ y¯g for all n ∈ N, g ∈ Gprivn , t ∈ T, s ∈ S
y¯g ≤ y¯ubg for all n ∈ N, g ∈ Gprivn , t ∈ T, s ∈ S
Zonal Kirchhoff’s First Law (ZKFL):∑
n∈N∩Zk
dt,n,s =
∑
n∈N∩Zk
∑
g∈Gprivn
yspott,g,s +
∑
l∈δin
Zk
(L)
f spott,l,s −
∑
l∈δout
Zk
(L)
f spott,l,s for all Zk ∈ Zs, t ∈ T, s ∈ S
Market Coupling Flow Restrictions (MCF):
− βlf¯l ≤ f spott,l,s ≤ βlf¯l for all l ∈ Linters ∩ Lex, t ∈ T, s ∈ S
− zlβlf¯l ≤ f spott,l,s ≤ zlβlf¯l for all l ∈ Linters ∩ Lnew, t ∈ T, s ∈ S.
Variable Restrictions (VR):
yspott,g,s ≥ 0 for all n ∈ N, g ∈ Gprivn , t ∈ T, s ∈ S
dt,n,s ≥ 0 for all n ∈ N, t ∈ T, s ∈ S
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B.2. Redispatch Level: Optimal Transmission Investment and Optimal
Cost-based Redispatch.
max
∑
s∈S
pis
∑
n∈N
∑
t∈T
τ
∫ dt,n,s
0
pt,n,s(ξ) dξ −
∑
g∈Galln
cvarg y
redi
t,g,s

−
∑
l∈Lnew
cinvl zl −
∑
n∈N
∑
g∈Galln
cinvg y¯g
s.t. Kirchhoff’s First Law (KFL):
dt,n,s =
∑
g∈Galln
yredit,g,s +
∑
l∈δinn (L)
f redit,l,s −
∑
l∈δoutn (L)
f redit,l,s for all n ∈ N, t ∈ T, s ∈ S
Kirchhoff’s Second Law (KSL):
f redit,l,s −Bl(θt,n,s − θt,j,s) = 0 for all l = (n, j) ∈ Lex, t ∈ T, s ∈ S
−Ml(1− zl) ≤ f redit,l,s −Bl(θt,n,s − θt,j,s) ≤Ml(1− zl) for all l = (n, j) ∈ Lnew, t ∈ T, s ∈ S
Voltage Phase Angle of Reference Node (VPA):
θt,nˆ,s = 0 for all t ∈ T, s ∈ S
Transmission Flow Limits (TFL):
− f¯l ≤ f redit,l,s ≤ f¯l for all l ∈ Lex, t ∈ T, s ∈ S
− zlf¯l ≤ f redit,l,s ≤ zlf¯l for all l ∈ Lnew, t ∈ T, s ∈ S
Generation Capacity Limits (GCL):
yredit,g,s ≤ αgτ y¯g for all n ∈ N, g ∈ Galln , t ∈ T, s ∈ S
Variable Restrictions (VR):
yredit,g,s ≥ 0 for all n ∈ N, g ∈ Galln , t ∈ T, s ∈ S
zl ∈ {0, 1} for all l ∈ Lnew
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Appendix C. Notation and Symbols
Table 5. Sets
Symbol Description
G Transmission network
N Set of nodes of the transmission network
T Set of time periods
S Set of all considered scenarios
Zs Set of zones in scenario s ∈ S
Galln Set of all generation technologies at node n ∈ N
Gprivn Set of private generation technologies at node n ∈ N
Gbun Set of backup generators at node n ∈ N
Lex Set of all existing transmission lines (set of arcs of graph G)
Lnew Set of all candidate transmission lines
Linters Set of all inter-zonal transmission lines in scenario s ∈ S
Table 6. Variables
Symbol Description Unit
dt,n,s Demand of node n ∈ N in time period t and scenario s ∈ S MW
pt,n,s Electricity price at node n ∈ N in time period t ∈ T and scenario s ∈ S e/MWh
y¯g Installed generation capacity of generator g ∈ Galln , n ∈ N MW
yt,g,s Power generation of generator g ∈ Galln , n ∈ N in scenario s ∈ S MW
ft,l,s Power flow on line l ∈ Lex ∪ Lnew in time period t and s ∈ S MW
θt,n,s Voltage angle at node n ∈ N in time period t and s ∈ S rad
zl Decision variable for candidate line l ∈ Lnew —
Table 7. Parameters
Symbol Description Unit
cinvg Investment cost of candidate generation technology g ∈ Galln , n ∈ N e/MW
cvarg Variable cost of generation technology g ∈ Galln , n ∈ N e/MWh
cinvl Investment cost of candidate transmission line l ∈ Lnew e
Bl DC power flow scaled susceptance of line l ∈ Lex ∪ Lnew MW
f¯l Maximum power flow on line l ∈ Lex ∪ Lnew MW
Ml Parameter for linearization of Kirchhoff’s second law for line l ∈ L —
τ Length between two consecutive time periods t, t+ 1 ∈ T h
αg Equivalent availability parameter of generator g ∈ Galln , n ∈ N —
pis Probability of scenario s ∈ S —
